Building Canada Initiatives: The World Needs More Canada – Particularly its Critical Minerals and Mining Capabilities

U.S.-China Trade Tensions

Exhibit 22 shows the tariff rates between the United States and China since 2018. Rates between the two countries rose dramatically as trade tensions escalated in 2025. Critical minerals have factored heavily into these dynamics. Trade tensions emerged under the Biden administration, which saw initial implementations of export licensing measures in 2023 and 2024. These measures were broadened and escalated in 2025 as trade tensions rose sharply with the Trump 2.0 administration, particularly as tariffs were increased by the United States. Headline tariffs have moderated since their 2025 peak, though a substantial tariff structure remains in place under other measures within the U.S. legal system. Prices for many critical minerals and rare earth elements remain elevated relative to pre-Trump era due to measures implemented by both sides.

Per Exhibit 13 earlier in the report, processing interest in China is dominant in 17 of the 21 critical mineral categories evaluated, which includes a 90% market share in rare earth elements. Exhibit 23 provides helpful insight into the strategic importance of control of the value chain, per the “metal wheel,” which shows how carrier elements can beget co-products and by-products from production and processing.

U.S.-Ukraine Critical Minerals Agreement

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky met with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., on February 28, 2025 – 12 years and one month after Russia first invaded Ukraine. The two leaders have a long history, and their Oval Office exchange was memorable for its intensity amid questions over funding and positioning in the conflict. Behind-the-scenes negotiations ensued, resulting in the official signing of a framework agreement for the United States to share in Ukraine’s mineral commodities on April 30, 2025. The United States made significant initial demands in relation to its view of weapons and funding provided up to that point in time. Ukraine hoped the United States and its historical allies would provide an outright security guarantee and an aspirational path toward membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Trump administration’s Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent described the deal as follows to Fox News:

It does not include a military guarantee, but what it does include is an implicit guarantee that if the United States of America is heavily invested in the economic future – I call it an economic security guarantee – the more assets that U.S. companies have on the ground, the bigger interest that the U.S. has in the future of the Ukrainian economy doing well, the more security it creates for the Ukrainian people, and the higher the return for the U.S. taxpayer.

Prior to the signing of the agreement, few details were known, so there was significant uncertainty, but enough information had entered the public domain to make directional observations about:

·       The strategic importance of critical minerals and other natural resources to energy, technology, and security.

·       The attractiveness of net profits interest (NPI) vehicles.

·       How to think about valuation of such assets and the potential of Ukraine’s natural resources.

Exhibit 24 endeavours to analyze these questions: the left chart shows the relative scale of U.S. and European military funding around the time of the negotiation process (denoted by 1s in the chart) versus U.S. demands for reimbursement (denoted by 2 and 3). We have applied greyscale to the Deal 3 bar in the chart, given inherent uncertainties about the future of Ukraine and capital investment.

The middle chart provides a sense of the scale of the funding in comparison with Ukraine’s pre-invasion GDP. We have further evaluated Ukraine’s mineral commodities output for 2021 and measured the value in 2026 pricing. To derive an NPI, we reduced mineral revenues by 20% (Russia occupies this amount of Ukrainian territory), and we further assumed a 50% cash flow margin to account for costs and then applied a 50% interest to those cash flows. This effectively equates to a 20% royalty take of pre-invasion revenues from Ukraine’s mineral commodities (critical, non-critical, energy, and agricultural). Based on our calculation, a 5x multiple of the NPI would drive an implied payout value of U.S. military funding in Ukraine (the lower funding estimate, in line with Europe’s contribution, as opposed to the higher figures floated by the Trump administration).

The agreement is positioned as the “Establishment of a United-States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund.” The fine print of the agreement reads “Ukraine Agreed Revenue” and states this “means 50% of all royalties (rent payments), licence fees, and amounts payable under production sharing agreements.” What a post-conflict Ukraine and its royalty structures will look like is perhaps in question, and half of such royalties may prove to be worth much less than meets the eye and would take some time to build up from the go-forward date of the agreement and new capital investment into the country, likely affecting the net present value of the agreement.

Our aim is to provide a sense of the scale of the war funding, U.S. demands, Ukraine’s past output, and its future potential. Clearly, conflict continues, with significant destruction of infrastructure and human capital, so the analysis we have outlined is intended to illustrate the potential implications of the arrangement. The right chart in Exhibit 24 shows the proportion of pre-invasion output allocated to critical, non-critical, energy, and agricultural mineral commodities, based on the U.S. Department of Energy’s 2023 Final List of Critical Minerals. We do not have more recent data for Ukraine’s output, and the agreement applies only to future developments, along with oil and natural gas (inclusive of liquefied natural gas). There are mixed views on the ultimate geological potential in critical minerals, rare earths, shale gas, potash, etc. The extent and viability of such upside is certainly subject to material uncertainties, given decades of under-investment.

Ukraine is not exactly supplying the world with large volumes of critical minerals to date. Exhibit 25 plots Ukraine’s exploitation of critical, non-critical, energy, and agricultural output alongside the dollars of revenue generated from doing so. Based on 2021 pre-conflict data, Ukraine produced crude iron ore in the highest quantity. Aluminum was the largest quantity of critical minerals produced at approximately 1.7 million tons. The lowest production of critical minerals are gallium (1 ton) and germanium (0.4 tons), which are typically used in the production of gallium nitride and silicon-germanium (SiGe) alloys that are important for high-performance transistors and other semiconductor devices. Ukraine has obviously sought to use the aspirations to grow its economy and exploit its potentially abundant resources as a way to engender U.S. support for its strategic interests in its conflict with Russia.

Estimating valuation multiples of Ukraine’s critical minerals is a subjective but perhaps instructive exercise. The NPI for minerals extracted that the United States could receive in its agreement with Ukraine appears to resemble the underlying interests of streaming and royalty companies. In Exhibit 26, we provide the current range of trading multiples for our streaming and royalty coverage, as well as trading multiples for the United States and Ukraine that are derived from country risk premium estimates (reach out to our team for more details on our country risk premium work), which can all collectively serve
as a starting point for determining the future potential of the agreement. An EV/EBITDA multiple of ~4x for assets in Ukraine is estimated from the country’s current corporate default spreads and sovereign credit rating, but for assets in which the United States has a vested interest (and incentive to support or defend), a higher multiple could potentially be supported (e.g., Taiwan’s ~11x multiple could be instructive, in relation to the unsettled nature of China’s claims to it and the United States’ protection of it). Additionally, looking to the contrasting valuations of select streaming and royalty companies focused on precious metals (EV/EBITDA range of 12x to 25x) versus base metals (5x to 10x) versus oil and gas (8x to 15x) is informative, with commodity price support and speculation and corporate market cap influencing sentiments.

Obviously, none of this analysis is to say these aforementioned companies are going into Ukraine any time soon, but it highlights the currency of critical minerals, rare earths, and other natural resources as proxies for power in today’s geopolitics, plus the valuation benefits of privileged positions within the capital markets enjoyed by well-run royalty, streaming, and NPI investment vehicles.

Greenland’s Role in Critical Minerals and Strategic Transportation

Reduced sea ice extent has opened up Arctic shipping routes and potentially points to increased resource access over time. These realities have become abundantly clear over the past year. Seasonal maximum and minimum Arctic sea ice extents in the Northern Hemisphere have become considerably more navigable, with minimum sea ice extent roughly one third lower over the past decade than at the end of the 20th century. The Arctic could see its first ice-free September as soon as the 2030s to 2050s.^xiv The polar region has since experienced both increased shipping activity and associated nautical mileage. There are eight countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States) plus six permanent Indigenous groups in the Arctic Council; co-operation in the region is the aim, but in reality, there are long-standing and evolving competing claims on polar waters (plus some land, as evidenced by the resolution of Canada and Denmark’s Whisky War over Hans Island). The Arctic Council’s working group Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) noted that, over the most recently measured decade, the number of ships in the polar region has increased 37% and nautical mileage is up 111%. While polar shipping activity remains nascent globally, the strategic importance of arctic shipping routes and Greenland’s position within the region is on the rise. Increased activity heightens consideration of the Northwest Passage, plus increased collaboration of Russia and China in the Northern Sea Route, which can halve Asia-Pacific-to-Europe routes, avoid instability in the Suez Canal, and advance geopolitical agendas.

All these issues point to the rising strategic importance of Greenland in critical minerals for energy and technology dominance. The PAME data indicate bulk container nautical mileage is up 205% over the most recently measured decade, much of it due to Baffinland’s Mary River Mine in Nunavut, an iron ore development. Further extractives in Canada’s Arctic region, such as Glencore’s Raglan nickel mining complex in Nunavik, Quebec, highlight the potential of northern resource development. The Review of the Critical Raw Material Resource Potential in Greenland indicates moderate to high estimated resource potential for 24 of the 34 minerals on the European Union’s critical raw materials list. In reference to Canadian-U.S. trade, President Trump stated, “We don’t need anything they have,” while separate remarks made during the same early Trump 2.0 period at Mar‑a‑Lago signalled interest in Canada’s asset base. The same aspiration has been apparent with respect to Greenland, as concern over assertive U.S. overtures that would not rule out the use of force came to a head at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026. Access to natural resources and critical minerals matters and will continue to grow in importance; Canada’s mining industry is positioned to contribute meaningfully to securing supply for global trading partners.

The G7, USA 55, and Project Vault

Over the past year, Canada has positioned itself as a global leader in critical minerals through its G7 presidency and domestic policy action. At the 2025 G7 Leaders’ Summit, Canada drove adoption of the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan, focused on diversifying supply chains, mobilizing capital, promoting innovation, and building standards‑based markets with strong environmental, labour, and traceability requirements. Canada also helped launch the Critical Minerals Production Alliance, unlocking 26 projects and partnerships with allied countries to accelerate graphite, rare earth, and scandium production. Domestically, Ottawa expanded funding, offtake agreements, and infrastructure support to advance Canada as a trusted, responsible critical mineral supplier. Canada has also recently formed a critical minerals partnership with Greenland.

Increased stability in commodity prices can fundamentally support all critical-mineral-related investment opportunities, and the United States’ 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial appeared primarily focused on laying the groundwork for spurring project development by starting to address these ongoing pricing challenges. U.S. Vice President JD Vance's introductory speech at the Critical Minerals Ministerial event in February 2026 highlighted a strategic critical minerals stockpile initiative by the United States called Project Vault, which could support prices as critical minerals are bought at minimum prices, and the signing of new bilateral critical mineral trade frameworks with 13 of the 54 attending countries. All 55 countries at the event show strengths in certain parts of the critical mineral value chain, whether it be extraction, processing, financing, manufacturing, or technological innovation, and seem to share a common view that enhanced partnerships and co-operation can facilitate more meaningful progress in the critical mineral market. Vice President Vance stated:

How many times cumulatively have one of us, or many of us, heard some variation of the story I’m about to tell. A lithium mine, a gallium recovery center, you name it, is announced sometimes with years of planning and financing nearly in place. Then overnight foreign supply floods the market, the prices collapse and investors pull out, the project stalls and eventually dies on the vine.^xv

These statements by the Vice President followed earlier announcements by the United States in January 2026 about introducing price minimums for imported critical minerals and minimum pricing for mineral processing. Exhibit 27 highlights the inherent challenges of commodity price cycles, as well as the added difficulties posed by cyclical effects in higher-volatility critical minerals, such as lithium.

The effort could counter the challenges presented by China’s critical mineral production, where the country’s increased supply can undercut prices and make new projects uneconomical. Smelters and refineries located in Canada and the United States have struggled with profitability in recent decades, but as supply chain security and trade partnerships are prioritized, so too is the leverage offered by a fully integrated domestic critical mineral supply chain. As the agreements can be a steppingstone toward a functional critical mineral market, the framework presented at the Ministerial event also included the launch of Project FORGE, which continues the earlier efforts of the Minerals Security Partnership, where members aim to reduce fragmentation and instead collaborate more closely on trade policy and efforts.

Summary maps of critical mineral projects in each of Canada’s provinces and territories are presented on page 50 onward, and high-level estimates from NRCan for some of the country’s discovered critical minerals are 3,200 tonnes of gold, 8.3 million tonnes of copper, 694,000 tonnes of U3O8 (uranium), and 1.1 billion tonnes of potash. Using spot commodity pricing, the theoretical value of these critical mineral resources are approximately $500 billion worth of gold, $100 billion worth of copper, $100 billion worth of uranium, and $300 billion worth of potash, and from there we can start to understand the potential upside opportunity for Canada’s mining sector.

Canada’s mining production rates are currently depleting these resources by approximately 6% per year for copper and gold and around 2% per year for potash and uranium, implying that Canada’s current supply of copper and gold could exhaust in 15 to 20 years without new exploration discoveries, while current potash and uranium supplies could exhaust in 40 to 50 years. Our view is that Canada’s opportunity currently lies in increasing its capacity for the production of copper and gold, which would be supported by increased exploration, while concentrated sub-sectors, such as uranium and potash, have opportunities concentrated toward established industry leaders, such as Cameco Corporation and Nutrien.

Reviewing Canada’s total copper resources over the past 30 years shows that resources have historically been replaced at roughly the same rate as extraction. Exhibit 29 shows that copper exploration in Canada has stayed roughly flat since 1996, with new deposits being found in proportion to the annual rate of copper production; however, this trend is notably contrasted by another mining country, Australia. Prior to 2002, Australia had copper resources that were roughly 2.5x the amount found within Canada, and new exploration discoveries roughly matched the rate of production in both countries. From 2003 until 2006, a period when copper prices went from less than $1/lb to over $3/lb, resources in Australia that were previously subeconomic were reassessed and the country’s total resources approximately doubled. The higher commodity price improved cash flows across the industry, and many companies subsequently increased their exploration spending, particularly focusing on areas proximal to existing operations. The results of increased exploration, aided by higher commodity prices, started showing between 2008 and 2011, when Australia’s total copper resources approximately doubled again following reassessments at BHP’s Olympic Dam mine and renewed prospecting enthusiasm across the industry.

Our view is that Build Canada efforts in the mining sector are a positive catalyst for all mining companies, but that companies with large-scale exploration and development-stage assets could be prime candidates for accelerated development through government support and partnership as well as strong acquisition targets.

Exploration History and Upside Potential

Although Canada’s total copper resources have remained relatively flat over the past 30 years, mineral exploration spending within the country over the past 10 years, as shown in Exhibit 30, could indicate the potential for future discoveries that drive resource growth. Mineral exploration spending in Canada has notably increased from just over $2 billion per year from 2016 to 2019 to over $4 billion per year in 2021 and beyond, recently hitting an all-time high of $5.3 billion in the most recent year and consistently exceeding spending in another leading mining jurisdiction, Australia. Segmented values for exploration in Canada shows us that exploration spending for copper and other base metals was under $500 million per year from 2016 to 2019, but this annual amount has been more than double since 2021, exceeding $1 billion annually in each of the past five years. We note that base metals has accounted for a growing percentage of exploration spending in Canada, while spending on precious metals remains the majority at ~50% of spending. In further segmenting exploration spending, we note that roughly two-thirds of exploration spending is near existing mineral deposits (brownfield), while the remaining one-third is spent pursuing greenfield deposits.

While exploration spending can be a bit like spinning a roulette wheel, our view is that Canada’s current mineral resources are severely understated compared with the country’s implied potential, and we think there is strong upside opportunity for exploration across the country. We also see new mining operations as an opportunity to catalyze further exploration, as leveraging nearby infrastructure can substantially reduce costs and uncertainty in exploration activities.

What Is the Implied Value of Canada’s Resources and How Does It Compare?

As Canada’s current copper resources of 8.3 million tonnes have a theoretical value of around $100 billion using spot commodity prices, Australia’s current resources of 108 million tonnes have an implied value of around $1.3 trillion. The Scotiabank GBM mining team forecasts annual demand growth of +2.0% from 2026 to 2030 versus historical growth of +2.9%, while also estimating that net copper mine supply growth will be relatively anemic in the medium term due to scheduled depletions and lower grades at existing mines. The supply side is likely to shift during the 2030-2035 period, which is when the Scotiabank GBM mining team expects several large-scale global projects to be developed, particularly in Argentina under the relatively attractive Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI; Large Investment Incentive Regime), where Argentina is expected to increase copper output to ~1.3 million tonnes per year by 2035 (versus nil today).

A primary catalyst for the new copper outlook in Argentina has been RIGI, a strategic government program designed to encourage large-scale investments. RIGI aims to create stability in Argentina with regard to taxes, customs, and foreign exchange (lasting 30 years) and may help alleviate investor concerns about risk and volatility in the country.

In contrast to Argentina, Canada has consistently been a leader in the mining sector, but like other leaders in mining, it receives some criticisms about the speed of regulatory approvals and permitting. Recent Build Canada initiatives, along with Canada’s newly created Major Projects Office, appear to be aimed at addressing these criticisms and offering solutions, as changes and disruptions to international relationships and trade promote more active involvement by governments. As corporate development teams of major mining companies consider their available opportunities, we expect Canada’s already-established and possible future world-class deposits to increase exploration investment, potentially serving as a positive catalyst for companies with exploration-stage or development-ready mineral assets.

Considering Potential for More Smelting and Refining in Canada

Building new critical mineral processing facilities, such as copper smelters and refineries, is often listed among the long-term value-creation opportunities for the Canadian mining industry, but while more integrated domestic supply chains present security benefits and growth potential, the profitability margins and environmental histories of existing facilities reveal ongoing challenges for companies considering these opportunities today. Examples of existing mineral processing facilities in Canada are Glencore’s Horne Smelter and Canadian Copper Refinery (CCR) in Quebec and Teck’s Trail Operations in British Columbia, with each being the only ones of their kind in Canada. However, while these facilities have long operating histories, the industry’s current environment of record-low treatment-charge revenues being earned by these facilities, along with an uncertain market outlook, has been driving strategic reviews about long-term viability.

Existing Processing Facilities Appear Critically Important, but Marginally Profitable

Glencore’s metallurgical copper business, which includes Horne and CCR, posted an EBITDA margin of 1.7% and an EBIT margin of 0.3% in 2024, and looking at the past 10 years shows very modest averages of 4.3% and 2.4%, respectively. Teck’s Trail Operations shows similar results, with an EBITDA margin of 0.6% and EBIT margin of -3.3% in 2024 and 10-year averages of 5.0% and 0.8%, respectively. Similar to Glencore, the profitability of Teck’s smelting and refining business has trended lower over the past 10 years, and just as Glencore has sold its PASAR smelter and refinery in the Philippines in 2025 and been completing an ongoing strategic review about the future of Horne and CCR, Teck’s merger with Anglo American PLC has also signalled a comprehensive review of how the smelting and refining operating segment fits in with the company’s overall strategy and profitability.

The Anglo Teck merger announcement included a positive decision about investing $850 million to enhance the Trail Operations, which appears to look beyond the marginal profitability of the segment and leans into the facility’s strategic importance to the company – and potentially its importance to the country. Despite potentially high capital investment requirements and uncertainty about potential environmental impacts, smelters and refineries are fundamental parts of the critical minerals industry and provide direct benefits, such as jobs and infrastructure, as well as less direct benefits, such as economic diversification, supply chain security, and international trade leverage. A substantial increase in Canadian copper mining activity through expanding existing mines and ramping up new ones could drive Glencore to invest in the modernization of its Horne Smelter and catalyze construction of a similar facility in Western Canada to support the region’s mines.

Treatment and Refining Charges at All-Time Lows

Treatment charges and refining charges (TC/RCs) earned by smelters for copper concentrates are currently at record lows as global smelter utilization is around 75%. This severe imbalance between smelter capacity and copper concentrate supply is shown in Exhibit 32, which shows a 10-year price history of TCRCs for copper imported to China. The profitability of many smelters and refineries is currently being supported by long-term pricing agreements, while TC/RC spot pricing has steeply declined to $0 and below, as global utilization is around 75% and, in some cases, smelters are paying mining companies for additional concentrate so that their facilities can operate efficiently. The high demand for copper concentrates is due to the modest growth in new copper mines compared with refining capacity, and supply shocks to existing operations have also contributed, such as First Quantum Minerals Ltd.’s Cobre Panama mine shutdown and annual production guidance reductions by major producers such as Anglo American PLC.

The Scotiabank GBM copper outlook until 2030 expects the current supply shortfall to continue, where increased demand for copper exceeds supply growth. There has been a 14% growth in global copper output from mining operations since 2016, but this has been outpaced by 19% growth in refined copper production and 21% growth in copper consumption over the same period. The Scotiabank GBM mining team forecasts annual shortfalls of 350,000 tonnes and 99,000 tonnes per year in 2026 and 2027, respectively, with elevated risk of supply-side underperformance. A few examples of the underperformance have been operating setbacks at several of the world’s largest mines, including Collahuasi, El Teniente, Grasberg, Kamoa-Kakula, and QB2, which have been compounded by the Cobre Panama curtailment.

In our view, the current supply-side shortfall presents a notable opportunity for copper producers to realize excess cash flow, reinvest in current operations and exploration, and potentially accelerate ramp-up at new mine sites. Further, expedited reviews and approvals of new copper mines would be a great opportunity for the Canadian industry, as numerous new mines sites would be required to support the case for new domestic smelting and refining capacity.

Environmental Concerns and “Not in My Backyard” Pushback

While mining operations themselves require extensive environmental impact assessments before they are potentially approved for mineral extraction, the smelters and refineries that process the concentrates produced by these mining operations can oftentimes be viewed with more scrutiny, as they can be situated closer to urban centres and may have greater potential for pollution and other environmental impacts. A positive trend we have seen in Canada and many other developed countries over recent decades has been an increased priority on environmental considerations when pursuing economic development, but an indirect result of focusing on activities within our own borders has been that certain industries continue to be offshored to regions with less stringent environmental regulation. There are only a few smelters and refineries remaining in North America, and the shift of these facilities to overseas regions, particularly Asia, has pushed environmental conversations into conversations about supply chain strength, international trade, and national security. Freeport-McMoRan Inc.’s copper smelter in Miami, Arizona, is an example of trade-off considerations, where its critical importance as one of only two copper smelters in the United States is offset by concerns drawn from the facility’s two-year government exemption on emissions limits for pollutants such as lead, arsenic, and chromium. As copper and other critical minerals underpin the products needed across sectors and facilitate critical technology and infrastructure, we believe there are opportunities for strengthened government partnerships in Canada if these processing facilities are to continue operating or even expand.

New Canadian Copper Smelter Case Study

A case study regarding the potential profitability of a new smelter in Canada and the new supply of copper concentrate needed to support such a facility can be drawn from Foran Mining Corporation’s McIlvenna Bay project in Saskatchewan. The project’s 2025 technical report shows that the site is forecast to produce 1.16 million dry metric tonnes of copper concentrate with an average copper grade of 28.1% over its 18-year mine life (equivalent to 40 million lb of copper per year). At a spot price of $5.50/lb of copper, the project could earn life-of-mine revenues of approximately $4 billion from its copper concentrate, while incurring estimated life-of-mine treatment and refining costs of $80 million and an additional $230 million for transporting and handling the concentrate. This implies an estimated $18 million being spent each year to turn the copper concentrate from McIlvenna Bay into a refined copper product.

The $18 million per year in copper refining costs appears modest compared with the $4 billion in copper revenues, but this is just one aspect of a complex industry. Existing copper smelters in North America such as Horne, Garfield, Miami, and La Caridad all have capacity for around 200,000 tonnes of copper per year, implying that McIlvenna Bay could fill around 10% of a smelter’s capacity or that 10 similarly sized copper mines would be needed to reach full capacity.

Our view is that the current commodity price environment creates a strong incentive for copper companies to ramp up production through expansion and greenfield projects, while the excess capacity available at global copper smelters (which operated around 75% utilization in 2025) appears to limit opportunities to smelt and refine copper domestically. Counterarguments to onshore processing of copper and other critical minerals could be based on national security, international trade leverage, or a much longer-term outlook on commodity prices; however, we believe these efforts would need to be led by the government in partnership with large cap mining companies. The mining sector has seen notable growth as commodity prices have surged, and Canada has indeed benefited (particularly gold miners), but the current list of major mining companies is limited and only a few currently have active operations in Canada.

Building on Canada’s Competitive Mining Advantages

In our view, the current supply-side shortfall in copper concentrate presents a notable opportunity for copper miners to realize excess cash flow and increase production in the near term, reinvest in current operations and exploration in the medium term, and potentially accelerate ramp-up at new mine sites in the longer term. Further, expedited reviews and approvals of new copper mines would be a great opportunity for the Canadian industry and catalyze economic growth through mining activities, as well as indirect growth in supporting industries. New mines that are incremental to Canada’s total annual production will be needed in the future to further support the few smelters operating in Canada, such as Glencore’s Horne and Anglo Teck’s Trail Operations, while the case for new domestic smelting and refining capacity could potentially be supported with substantial increases in greenfield and brownfield production expansions.

We view government support for continuing operations at Glencore’s and Anglo Teck’s facilities as being aligned with the national Build Canada strategy and a scenario of increased mining production of critical minerals such as copper, lead, and zinc from nearby mining operations. In our view, ongoing support and potential expansion opportunities at these existing facilities currently appear much more feasible compared with pursuing new-build processing options in new locations. However, currently favourable commodity market conditions can hopefully drive efforts to increase supply from Canadian mining operations and align with Canada’s competitive advantage as a large natural resource base with mining expertise.

The maps in Exhibit 33 show the locations of the Trail, Horne, and CCR smelters in Canada. Canada’s critical minerals processing capacity is geographically concentrated, infrastructure driven, and anchored in Eastern Canada due to proximity to key waterways that provide access to both North American and global markets. Aluminum smelters also have a strategic advantage in Eastern Canada due to their ability to harness decarbonized electricity markets and proximity to key transportation waterways such as the St. Lawrence River. There are also select important nodes in the western provinces, shown via the Trail smelter, which can be hotspots for further growth, as much of Canada’s mining resource base exists in British Columbia. 

To quantify the potential incremental steel demand to be generated by the proposed Alto high-speed rail project, we developed an illustrative principles-based estimate. Based on the public statement provided by the Chief Executive Officer of Alto, 4,000 kilometres of rail line would be required to construct the tracks alone, which informs our calculation of the direct steel requirements for the rails themselves. Leveraging data provided by the American Society of Civil Engineers for the cross-sectional area of comparable high-speed rail tracks and length of line, we estimate that at least 230,000 tonnes of steel would be required to construct the tracks alone, growing to 600,000 tonnes or more when supporting infrastructure is also included, per Exhibit 34.

We do not expect this amount of steel to be required all at once, as large-scale infrastructure projects typically require at least a decade to construct. Therefore, using a 10-year time horizon, we determined that the mass of steel that may be required on an annualized basis would be approximately 60,000 tonnes. Furthermore, estimating that it takes around 1.6 tonnes of iron ore to create 1 tonne of steel, assuming no iron units coming from ferrous scrap, the implied iron ore requirements would be near 98,000 tonnes per annum.

To put +60,000 tonnes of steel production per year into context, Canada’s current annual production fluctuates near 12.5 million tonnes, implying the project could account for 0.5% of demand. Although Canadian steel mills do not currently produce rail steel, they have in the past, and “Canada being its own best customer” could be an indication that converting an existing mill and securing a domestic supply is more likely.

While iron ore and steel producers, particularly those in Canada, currently sell their products globally to the highest bidders using long-term contracts, the incremental increase in demand from the Alto high-speed rail project and its proximity to steel mills in Ontario and Quebec, plus iron ore production in Labrador City, Newfoundland and Labrador, could drive deeper consideration for made-in-Canada solutions. Industries that prioritize long-term contracts over spot pricing underscore the importance of strong supplier–customer relationships. While ~1 million tonnes of iron ore being used to produce 600,000 tonnes of rail steel over a 10-year period is material, a more substantial consideration would be developing the steel sector domestically to seize additional nation-building opportunities.

Canada’s production of iron ore was 59 million tonnes per annum in 2023, which depleted the country’s 6 billion tonnes of known reserves by ~1% and is estimated to have produced around 36 million tonnes of steel primarily in foreign mills. Per Exhibit 35, we expect annual demand for steel and iron ore in Canada to increase by 10%, based on the 10-year construction outlook for the projects referred to by the Major Projects Office in Tranches 1 and 2 in September and November 2025, along with the Canada-Alberta Memorandum of Understanding and Alto high-speed rail announcements that followed toward the end of 2025.

It remains to be seen to what degree Canada’s iron ore supplies and steel fabrication facilities achieve greater integration, but we do expect the federal and provincial governments to push for closer ties, supported by “buy Canadian” initiatives and the importance of steel to national security and the country’s heightened defence efforts. 

Major Natural Resources Projects Inventory

The exhibits that follow provide a provincial breakdown of the critical mineral mining projects in Canada. The projects are broken down into the following categories:

Advanced Projects

·     Active. Currently progressing through one of the various stages of development:

·     Announced and Planning. The project has been publicly announced, but regulatory approvals have not yet been submitted.

·     Under Review. The project has submitted applications for regulatory approvals and is awaiting a decision.

·     Approval Received. The project has received all major regulatory approvals required to start construction, but construction has not yet begun.

·     Under Construction. Construction of the project is underway.

·     On Hold/Suspended. The proposed project is either on hold or suspended altogether with the expected duration of the pause being the primary differentiator:

·     On Hold. The project has been temporarily interrupted and is expected to resume within a short period of time, usually two to six months.

·     Suspended. The project has been delayed for a long period of time or has officially been suspended by the project proponents.

Mines

·     Primary production sites where critical minerals are extracted.

Processing Facilities

·     Once the raw ore is mined, it must be processed to extract the valuable minerals and metals, which can be accomplished via a range of physical and chemical processes to achieve the desired concentration and purity.

There are also geological considerations that provide greater insight into the location of critical minerals and their concentration within Canada, which help to show the source of raw mineral wealth within the country. The geological formations are broken down into the following categories:

·     Intrusive rocks. A form of igneous rock that originated from the cooling and solidification of magma. Intrusive rocks are cooled below the earth’s surface, with slow cooling speed that allows for greater time for minerals to crystallize and concentrate. Typical examples of critical minerals found in this type of rock are lithium, tantalum, niobium, nickel, copper, cobalt, tin, tungsten, and platinum group metals. 

·     Metamorphic rocks. A form of rock that is created when existing rocks (igneous, sedimentary, or other forms) are transformed via intense heat, pressure, and/or chemical processes. What makes this type of rock unique is that the rock’s texture and mineral composition is changed without melting it, creating new minerals or concentrates. Typical examples of critical minerals found in this type of rock are graphite, vanadium, and copper.

·     Sedimentary rocks. Formed from the accumulation and cementation of sediments. Processes such as evaporation, precipitation, and erosion create a concentration of heavy minerals. Typical examples of critical minerals found in this type of rock are potash, lithium, uranium, zinc, lead, manganese, titanium, and zirconium.

·     Volcanic rocks. Formed from rapidly cooling magma on the surface of the earth and associated with intense hydrothermal activity. Typical examples of critical minerals found in this type of rock are copper, zinc, and lead. 

British Columbia

Alberta

Saskatchewan

Manitoba

Ontario

Quebec

Newfoundland and Labrador

New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island

Nunavut

Northwest Territories

Yukon

Major Natural Resources Projects Inventory

Processing facilities extract the valuable minerals and metals, which can be accomplished via a range of physical and chemical processes to achieve the desired concentration and purity. The exhibits that follow provide a provincial breakdown of critical mineral processing facility projects in Canada. The processing facilities are broken down into the following categories:

Active Processing Facilities

·     Facilities that are currently operational.

Advanced Processing Projects

·     Active. Currently progressing through one of the various stages of development shown below:

·     Announced and Planning. The project has been publicly announced, but regulatory approvals have not yet been submitted.

·     Under Review. The project has submitted applications for regulatory approvals and is awaiting a decision.

·     Approval Received. The project has received all major regulatory approvals required to start construction, but construction has not yet begun.

Under Construction. Construction of the project is underway.

Western Canada

Eastern Canada

Major Projects over $50 Million – Provincial Breakdown

The following tables show a provincial breakdown of critical and non-critical mineral projects in Canada with a proposed capex greater than $50 million. All projects are either in the “planned” or in the “under construction” phase of development.

Alberta

British Columbia

Manitoba

New Brunswick

Newfoundland and Labrador

Northwest Territories

Nova Scotia

Nunavut

Ontario

Quebec

Saskatchewan

Yukon

[i] https://www.ciris.info/learningcenter/peace-dividend/

[ii] https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/pantheon_files/files/publication/krauthammer.pdf

[iii] https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/43/4/7/12221/Bound-to-Fail-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-the-Liberal

[iv] https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/43/4/88/12226/Proliferation-and-the-Logic-of-the-Nuclear-Market?redirectedFrom=fulltext

[v] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

[vi] https://www.nber.org/papers/w34855

[vii] https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/01/20/principled-and-pragmatic-canadas-path-prime-minister-carney-addresses

[viii] https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/EU/CHN/USA

[ix] https://academic.oup.com/book/25592/chapter-abstract/192929209?redirectedFrom=fulltext

[x] https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/china-and-the-age-of-strategic-rivalry/expanding-regional-ambitions-the-belt-and-road-initiative.html

[xi] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/09/opinion/china-industrial-war-power-trader.html

[xii] https://natural-resources.canada.ca/minerals-mining/mining-data-statistics-analysis/minerals-mining-publications/canadian-mining-assets

[xiii] https://www.barrick.com/English/news/news-details/2025/barrick-mining-corporation/default.aspx

[xiv] https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-38511-8

[xv] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/02/opening-remarks-of-the-critical-minerals-ministerial/

This publication is a “resurfacing” of Scotiabank’s Global Equity Research publication, Focus On Building Canada – Mission Critical for Canada’s Mining Industry, originally published on April 7, 2026. For a copy of the equity research report, please visit https://scotia-portal.bluematrix.com/report/73b7438d-3c22-4221-8dde-4996f5303330 or contact your Scotiabank GBM representative

In this report, we have relied extensively upon NRCan’s Major Projects database and, in some cases, have made adjustments to the data to reflect more recent information from corporate disclosures. While significant efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, in some instances there may be information we have derived and utilized from NRCan’s data set that may no longer be current due to more recent developments and disclosures.